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SUMMARY
U.S. policy concerns over Taiwan in
recent years have centered on easing tensions
and striking a balance between the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan.  Despite
extensive Taiwanese trade with, and invest-
ment in, the Chinese mainland, the two sides
remain politically far apart and compete
strongly for international influence.  U.S.
policy in this triangular U.S.-PRC-Taiwan
relationship is complicated because:
— Taiwan is moving away from past advocacy
of “one China” to positions favoring an official
status for Taipei – as in a remark by  Taiwan’s
former President, Lee Teng-hui, that Taiwan-
China ties should be conducted on a “state-to-
state” basis.  Such statements have compli-
cated the U.S. “one China” policy and appear
to challenge Beijing’s claim to sovereignty
over the island;
— Beijing is strongly nationalistic and remains
adamant about its claim to Taiwan.  Also,
Beijing continues to claim that it has the right
to use force against Taiwan – a claim repeated
again in a white paper on Taiwan which the
PRC issued on February 21, 2000; 
— Many in Congress favor formal efforts,
including legislation, that go beyond adminis-
tration policy to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan
relations in ways sure to antagonize the PRC.
Meanwhile, U.S. officials in Congress and
elsewhere want to enhance investment oppor-
tunities for U.S. companies and ease trade
issues, notably Taiwan’s large trade surplus.
They also encourage political democratization,
even though it may foster separatist tendencies
among ethnic groups that Beijing regards as
threatening to state security.
Amid considerable congressional criticism
of President Clinton’s treatment of the Taiwan
issue during a trip to China in late June 1998,
the Senate that year passed resolutions
(S.Con.Res. 107, S.Con.Res. 30) in support of
Taiwan on July 10; a resolution in support of
Taiwan (H.Con.Res. 301) passed the House
on July 20. Proposed legislation in the 106th
Congress, (S. 693,  the Taiwan Security En-
hancement Act) focused on representational
and defense issues.  
Taiwan’s security and potential
vulnerability to the Chinese military is of
special concern.  The U.S. Defense Depart-
ment issued a congressionally mandated report
on rising military strengths on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait in 1999.  The report intensified
arguments on whether the United States
should provide ballistic missile defense systems
to Taiwan despite strenuous objections from
Beijing. In late April, 1999, the Clinton Ad-
ministration sold to Taiwan advanced early
warning radars useful against missile attacks.
Taiwan continues to seek Aegis destroyers and
other advanced weapons systems from the
United States which could  enhance its defense
capabilities.
In hotly contested presidential elections
on March 18, 2000, Taiwan voters elected
Chen Shui-bian, a member of the pro-
independence Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP).  Chen’s victory was Beijing’s most
feared outcome in the elections, and raises
concerns that Taiwan-PRC tensions will in-
crease still further.  U.S. options include at-
tempting to negotiate a new arrangement to
manage U.S. relations with Beijing and Taipei,
or remaining flexible given competing pres-
sures from the two capitals, while deferring a




On July 24, 2001, supporters of Taiwan’s former President, Lee Teng-hui, who led the
Nationalist (KMT) Party for over 10 years, announced the formation of a new political party
in Taiwan, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU).  Organizers of the new Party said they
planned to field as many as 40 candidates in the upcoming legislative elections in December
2001.
On April 24, 2001, the Bush Administration announced its willingness to sell Taiwan
a new assortment of defense articles, to include diesel submarines, P-3C anti-submarine
aircraft, and Kidd-class destroyers.  The following day, in an April 25 ABC television
interview, President Bush was asked whether he would use the “full force of [the] American
military” if China attacked Taiwan.  He responded, “Whatever it took to help Taiwan defend
herself.”  The White House later denied a change in U.S. policy.      
On February 14, 2001, Premier Chang Chun-hsiung announced that Taiwan would
immediately resume construction of its 4th nuclear power plant.  Construction had been
halted on October 27, 2000, by Taiwan’s new President, Chen Shui-bian, in a decision that
engendered much controversy and an effort to oust Chen from office.  The 4th nuclear power
plant project had been championed by the former ruling Nationalist Party. 
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Background to U.S. Interests in Taiwan
U.S. involvement with the government of Taiwan (known as the Republic of China or
ROC) has its roots in the World War II U.S. alliance with the Nationalist Chinese government
of Chiang Kai-shek, then on mainland China.  In October 1949, upon its defeat by the Chinese
communist forces of Mao Zedong, Chiang’s government fled to Taiwan, an island off the
south China coast.  While on the mainland the Chinese Communist Party established the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chiang’s ROC government on Taiwan insisted that the
communist government was not credible, and that Chiang’s ROC administration was the only
legitimate government of all China.  For the next 30 years, the United States supported this
claim with U.S. military protection and over $5 billion in military and economic aid,  allowing
Chiang and his one- party government (the Kuomintang Party, or KMT) to consolidate their
position on Taiwan. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. forces used Taiwan as a forward base against Sino-Soviet
communism in Asia.  After President Nixon’s opening to Beijing in 1971-72, and the major
pullback of U.S. forces in Asia under the guidelines of the “Nixon doctrine,” U.S. officials
viewed the mainland government more as a strategic asset against the U.S.S.R. than an
adversary to be confronted in the Taiwan Strait.  In 1979, the United States broke defense
and other official ties with Taiwan to establish formal diplomatic relations with the PRC.  The
United States subsequently affirmed its security and other interests in Taiwan through the
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the continued supply of U.S. arms to Taiwan.  But this
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1 The texts of the Taiwan Relations Act and the 3 U.S.-China communiques that underpin bilateral
U.S.-China relations can be found in CRS Report 96-246.  
2 The TRA was signed on April 10, 1979, and enacted as P.L. 96-8.
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reflected a moral commitment to a former ally rather than U.S. interest in using Taiwan’s
strategic position for broader policy ends.  
With the thaw in the Cold War in the late 1980s and subsequent collapse of the Soviet
Union, U.S. interest in the PRC as a “strategic asset” in global politics declined.  China’s
burgeoning economy and sometimes assertive foreign policy in the 1990s revived U.S.
interest in finding pragmatic ways to deal with rising Chinese power.  Concurrently, the
United States deepened a broad array of economic, military, social, and other contacts with
Taiwan’s rapidly developing economy and society, and its newly democratic political system.
Today, the United States is an important investor and trading partner for Taiwan.  U.S.
markets receive about 25% of Taiwan’s exports, while the United States supplies a much
smaller percentage of Taiwan’s imports, leading to a $14.9 billion U.S. trade deficit with
Taiwan in 1998.  Taiwan continues to enjoy Export-Import Bank financing, Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) guarantees, most-favored-nation status, and ready access to
U.S. markets. Meanwhile, many U.S. leaders want to encourage Taiwanese enterprises to
invest in the United States.
U.S.-PRC-Taiwan Relations Since 1979
On January 1, 1979, the United States switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei
to Beijing.  In the U.S.-PRC joint communique announcing the change, the United States
recognized the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China and
acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China.1
As part of de-recognition, the United States also notified Taiwan authorities of intent to
terminate, effective January 1, 1980, the 1954 U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty.  In a
unilateral statement released on December 16, 1978, the United States declared that it
“continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that
the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.”  
Arms Sales to Taiwan.  Since de-recognition, U.S. policy toward Taiwan has been
one of studied ambiguity.  On the one hand, U.S. policymakers have adhered to a “one-
China” policy framework – acknowledging the PRC as China’s only legitimate political entity,
while promising not to recognize Taiwan as an independent entity with a separate identity.
On the other hand, the United States continues to sell defense weapons and equipment to
Taiwan and to have other, extensive contacts with Taiwan under the auspices of the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA)2 which created the domestic legal authority for conducting unofficial
relations with Taiwan.  The TRA is essentially a congressional construct, enacted by a
Congress unhappy with the Carter Administration’s minimal plans for how U.S. relations
were to be conducted with Taiwan after official relations were severed.  Of particular
importance in the current environment is Section 3 of the TRA, dealing with U.S. defense
commitments to Taiwan.  Section 3 is non-specific about the defense articles and services the
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United States will provide.  It merely calls for “such defense articles and services...as may be
necessary,” and gives Congress a role in determining what needs Taiwan may have.
Some in Congress believe that the TRA is outdated, and that Taiwan’s self-defense
capabilities have eroded while China has grown militarily more capable and more hostile. The
conclusions of a congressionally mandated report issued by the U.S. Department of  Defense
(DoD) in February 1999 appear to bolster this view.  The report assesses the military balance
between Taiwan and China, and concludes that in light of improvements in offensive military
capabilities, by the year 2005 China will have acquired the ability “to attack Taiwan with air
and missile strikes which would degrade key military facilities and damage the island’s
economic infrastructure.”  Congressional proponents of enhanced security for Taiwan suggest
that U.S. policy should be adjusted accordingly.  Policymakers are also disturbed that China
continues to insist publicly on its right to use force against Taiwan.  
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have often prompted strong objections from the PRC.  On
August 17, 1982, a U.S.- PRC joint communique addressed this point.  In that communique,
the PRC cited a “fundamental policy” of striving for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan
question.  The United States stated in the communique that it did not 
seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan
will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in
recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and
China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan.
U.S. government arms sales levels have slowly declined, but have remained over $600
million a year.  Taiwan’s 1992 purchase of 150 F-16 aircraft (worth $5.9 billion) represented
an exception to this trend.  U.S. transfers of military-related technology have allowed Taiwan
to develop advanced fighter aircraft and other military equipment to defend the island.  (See
CRS Report RS20483, Taiwan; Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.)  On August 1, 1999,
the Pentagon announced it would sell two E-2 electronic warfare aircraft to Taiwan, along
with radar detection equipment, and along with $150 million in aircraft spare parts. On April
17, 2000, the Clinton Administration decided to sell Taiwan an assortment of air defense
weapons, including PAVE PAWS radar (designed to monitor ballistic missiles); an upgraded
model of the Maverick air-to-ground missile; and the advanced medium range air-to-air
missile (or AMRAAM), with the latter to be stored in the United States unless China acquires
a similar missile capability.  The Administration followed a Pentagon recommendation not to
sell more sophisticated and controversial weapons that Taiwan had requested, such as the
Aegis battle management system, submarines, and P-3 Orion anti-submarine aircraft.  
The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. On February 17, 1999, the U.S. Defense
Department issued a congressionally mandated report on rising military strengths on both
sides of the Taiwan Strait.  The report intensified  arguments on whether the United States
should provide ballistic missile defense systems to Taiwan despite strenuous objections from
Beijing, and it reinforced the concerns of some Members that China poses more of a threat
now to Taiwan than in the past, and that Taiwan’s ability to defend itself has eroded over
time.   Consequently, in the 106th Congress, Members of both Houses introduced the Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act:  S. 693 (Helms, introduced on March 24, 1999), and H.R. 1838
(DeLay, introduced on May 18, 1999; H.Rept. 106-423).  These similar bills provided for
enhanced U.S.-Taiwan military communication and cooperation, and the strengthening of
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Taiwan’s security.  While maintaining that it shared the desire to bolster Taiwan, the Clinton
Administration saw the legislation as unnecessarily provocative and potentially harmful to
U.S. security interests.  Although the House passed its version of the legislation on February
1, 2000, by a vote of 341-70, the Senate never took up the bill. 
“One-China” Policy.  In addition to arms sales, Beijing criticizes other aspects of
continued U.S. support for Taiwan, saying that such gestures reduce Taipei’s interest in
negotiations on reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.  One of the most notable examples
of this occurred on May 22, 1995, when President Clinton, bowing to substantial
congressional pressure, changed Administration policy, and decided to allow Taiwan
President Lee Teng-hui to make a private visit to the United States. Beijing reacted with
strong military and rhetorical pressure on Taiwan.  Prior to Taiwan’s March 23, 1996
elections, the United States sent two carrier battle groups in response to PRC military
exercises in the Taiwan Strait.  The PRC exercises, which ended on March 25, 1996, were
a vain effort to discredit Lee, who won 54% of the vote in a field of four candidates in
presidential elections.  
Tensions began to ease after the election. During 1997 and 1998, Taiwan officials and
supporters of Taiwan in the United States were concerned with the Clinton Administration’s
willingness to respond to PRC pressure in strongly reaffirming the U.S. “one China” policy
in ways that appeared to curb support for Taiwan’s greater role in world affairs and its
possible independence in the future.  Some also suspected that the U.S. government was
behind suggestions from delegations of prestigious Americans visiting Taiwan and the
mainland in early 1998 that Taiwan should be more flexible in seeking political talks with
mainland China.  The Clinton Administration said the suspicions were wrong and that it had
not changed its longstanding “One China” policy in ways that would negatively affect Taiwan.
The 105th and 106th Congresses were inclined to support Taiwan despite objections from
Beijing or concerns by the Clinton Administration.  H.R. 2386 urging consideration of U.S.
support for a ballistic missile defense of Taiwan passed the House in the week after Chinese
President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Washington in October 1997.  H.R. 1757, a foreign affairs
authorization bill, passed the House and Senate in 1998 with a provision urging Taiwan’s
early entry into the WTO.  The Taiwan provision was included in H.R. 4328 (P.L. 105-277)
signed October 21, 1998.  H.Con.Res. 270 urging U.S. support for Taiwan’s security
unanimously passed the House two weeks before President Clinton’s departure for a summit
in Beijing in late June 1998.  H.R. 4103, the FY1999 Defense Appropriations bill, passed
Congress on September 29, 1998 with a provision calling for a Department of Defense study
of cross Strait military capabilities.  H.Con.Res. 334 urging Taiwan’s participation in the
World Health Organization passed the House on October 10, 1998.
Bush policy statement on U.S. defense of Taiwan.  On April 25, 2001, in an
ABC television interview, Charles Gibson asked President Bush that “...if Taiwan were
attached by China, do we have an obligation to defend the Taiwanese?”  The President
responded, “Yes, we do, and the Chinese must understand that.”  In followup, Gibson asked
“With the full force of American military?”  The President responded, “Whatever it took to
help Taiwan defend herself.”  Since the United States has no defense alliance with Taiwan and
has never pledged use of American military forces in the island’s defense, the President’s
answer caused several days of considerable controversy over whether the United States had
changed its policy toward Taiwan’s security.  State Department and White House officials,
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including President Bush, later reiterated U.S. support for the “one-China policy,” insisted
that there had been no change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan, and said that the President’s
April 25 statement was consistent with U.S. commitments in the Taiwan Relations Act.  
Taiwan-Mainland Relations
President Lee’s “State-to-State” relations comment.  Relations between the
PRC and Taiwan became noticeably more tense at the end of the 1990s.  Heightened tensions
began on July 9, 1999, when President Lee Teng-hui said that ties between Taiwan and China
should be considered on a “special state-to-state” basis.  Taiwan officials had been moving
incrementally in this direction for some time; in 1995, for instance, President Lee emphasized
that China and Taiwan were governed by “two governments,” and proposed that each side
enter international organizations “on an equal footing.”   Nevertheless, Lee’s July 1999
remark was seen by many as the most direct challenge to date concerning Beijing’s claim to
sovereignty over Taiwan. Beijing objected strenuously to the statement, saying it proved that
Lee had fundamentally changed previous policy in which Taiwan had claimed that there was
only “one China,” of which Taiwan was a part.  China adheres to the “one-China” policy, and
claims Taiwan as a “break-away” province that belongs to China.  Taiwan officials insisted
that Lee’s statement was not a policy change, but a “statement of fact” meant to reflect that
the island government’s 85-year existence entitled it to a status equal with China’s in cross-
strait dialogue.  The Lee remark also complicated U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan, since
the “one-China” premise has been used in various formulations by American officials to
describe U.S. policy concerning Taiwan. 
PRC “white papers”.   On February 21, 2000, the PRC issued its second “white
paper” about Taiwan, the first having been issued in August 1993.   In the most recent
statement, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” PRC officials offered a mix of
apparent conciliatory gestures and a new ominous-sounding assertion that if Taiwan
authorities tried to indefinitely delay cross-Strait talks about Taiwan’s future, then the PRC
would be “forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force.”
Previously, the PRC had reserved the right to use force in only two instances: if Taiwan
declared independence; and if Taiwan were invaded and occupied by a foreign country.  A
Washington Post article of February 23, 2000, cited a top Pentagon official as responding to
the new statement by warning the PRC of “incalculable consequences” if the PRC resorted
to force against Taiwan. 
On October 16, 2000, China published its third national security white paper, entitled
“China’s National Defense in 2000.”  The document listed China’s national defense
expenditures for 2000 at 121.29 billion renminbi – roughly U.S. $14.65 billion.  In describing
its view of the current international security situation, the white paper declared that there are
“new negative developments in the security situation” in the region.  The paper cited U.S.
weapons sales to Taiwan and consideration of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act by the
106th Congress as some of these negative developments.  The paper also stated that if Taiwan
were invaded or continues to refuse to negotiate on reunification with China, the Chinese
government “will have no choice but to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use
of force, to safeguard China’s sovereignty...”  
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China’s harsh rhetoric on Taiwan has raised concerns in some policy circles about the
prospects for military conflict in the area.  The danger of military conflict first became evident
during the PRC military exercises held at the time of  Taiwan’s presidential elections in March
1996. Following Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s personal visit to Cornell University in the
United States in June 1995, Beijing broke off high-level talks on cross-Strait relations,
stridently excoriated Lee for allegedly attempting to split China and lead Taiwan toward
independence, and conducted series of military exercises designed to intimidate the Taiwan
people.  
Following the U.S. show of force in the Taiwan area and Lee’s impressive victory in the
March 1996 presidential election, Beijing once again moderated its criticism of the Taiwanese
leader.  The PRC returned to reiterating its adherence to an ostensibly flexible stance to cross-
Strait relations, and advised that a renewed PRC use of force would only come as a last resort
in the face of egregious actions by Taipei and/or foreign powers designed to split Taiwan
from the mainland.  Chinese officials nonetheless remained suspicious and critical of Lee,
stressing that resumed dialogue in cross-Strait relations and improvement in the current tense
atmosphere depended on Taiwan’s adherence to the “principle of one China.”  
Beijing has also given top priority to checking Taiwan’s efforts to broaden its
international standing through so-called pragmatic diplomacy. Thus, it has countered
Taiwan’s efforts to establish formal relations with states already maintaining official ties with
Beijing, and it has pressed foreign governments to refuse to receive Taiwan leaders traveling
to their countries on an ostensibly private basis.  Partly as a result of PRC efforts, Taiwan
now maintains official relations with less than 30 countries, mostly small states in Central
America and the Caribbean, Africa, and the South Pacific. It is unable to host senior-level
meetings of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, even though Taiwan is
a member in good standing of the group, and it has been unsuccessful in gaining even
observer status in such U.N. affiliated groups as the World Health Organization.  Both China
and Taiwan have so far dealt reasonably well with the economic consequences of the 1997-
1998 Asian economic crisis. Politically, Taipei quickly used the crisis as an opportunity to
broaden high-level official contacts with most Southeast Asian governments seeking outside
assistance, and Beijing was unsuccessful is dissuading cash-starved Southeast Asian leaders
from seeking economic advantage through talks with senior Taiwan political leaders.
Despite PRC-Taiwan sparring on political issues, cross-Strait talks were held in April
1998, and high-level discussions took place in Shanghai and Beijing during October 14-19,
1998. These talks improved the atmosphere but did little to bridge the wide gap between the
negotiating positions of Beijing and Taipei. Both sides were anxious to show U.S. and world
opinion that they were not being obstructionist over cross-Strait issues.  Meanwhile,
economic, cultural and other exchanges between Taiwan and mainland China have grown. By
1999, Taiwanese investment in the mainland had reached a reported $30 billion.  Bilateral
trade, heavily in Taiwan’s favor, amounts to about $30 billion a year.  
Over 13 million visits have taken place from Taiwan to the mainland.  Over 250,000
mainland Chinese experts, entrepreneurs and others have traveled to Taiwan for consultations
and exchanges.  Exchanges of PRC-Taiwan scholars and experts for consultations on cross-
Strait and other issues provide, in the view of some Taiwanese officials, an active “second
track” for PRC-Taiwan dialogue.  Recent events in cross-Strait relations have included the
decision by oil companies in the PRC and Taiwan to explore jointly offshore areas for oil; the
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start of flights from Taiwan to the mainland with only a short stopover in Macao or Hong
Kong; and Taiwan’s opening to third-country ships, and selected mainland and Taiwanese
ships, to carry cargo to and from designated ports in Taiwan and on the mainland. Cross-
Strait economic relations are now so important for Taiwan that Taiwan government and
business leaders have been among the strongest, albeit largely silent, supporters of continued
U.S. most-favored-nation (MFN—now called “normal trade relations,” or NTR) tariff
treatment for China.  Withdrawal of MFN would have a serious negative impact on many
Taiwan businesses.
U.S. Policy Choices.  The United States remains the foreign power most closely
involved in PRC-Taiwan relations.  It seeks closer relations with both the PRC and Taiwan
and favors the peaceful exchanges across the Taiwan Strait.  Cross-Strait tensions since
mid-1995 challenge U.S. interest in stability in the region and raise the possibility of U.S.
involvement in a potential conflict there.
U.S. policy faces major challenges in attempting to strike a proper balance in the U.S.-
PRC-Taiwan triangular relationship:
! China’s growing economic, political and military power.  Increased Chinese
military capabilities are coupled with a reluctance to defer to the United
States, Taiwan, or others.  Strong nationalistic emphasis in Chinese domestic
politics and leadership uncertainty sometimes prompt PRC decision makers
to avoid other than politically safe nationalistic positions on key issues like
Taiwan.
! Taiwan’s assertiveness.  Economic growth, rapidly changing social
conditions and recent democratization reinforce efforts to increase Taiwan’s
stature in international affairs despite the objections of the PRC, and ongoing
efforts inside Taiwan to move away from a “one China” policy to one seen
by Beijing as a fundamental challenge. 
These competing forces sometimes combine with U.S. domestic interests.  For instance,
many in the 104th and 105th Congresses pushed for greater U.S. support for Taiwan while
Clinton administration officials warned against the effects of such initiatives on U.S.-PRC
relations.
Judging that the U.S. “one China” policy framework no longer works, some American
experts favor U.S. negotiations with Beijing and Taipei to strike a new “strategic bargain.”
The alternative, in their view, is continued conflicting pressure from Beijing and Taipei and
related U.S. domestic interests, leading to a passive U.S. policy that would increase
confrontation and possibly military conflict.
Others judge that such negotiations would cause more trouble than they are worth,
especially for what they see as a relatively weak U.S. Administration.  Rather, the
administration can continue to adjust its “one China” policy to accommodate pressures from
Taipei and Beijing and their U.S. domestic supporters.  From this perspective, not all trends
in Taiwan and Beijing argue for increased confrontation;  Beijing and Taipei have moderated
their respective political positions recently, while economic, social, cultural and other
non-governmental interchange grows markedly.  If both Taipei and Beijing can be persuaded
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that continuation of current trends is acceptable, then U.S. policy can continue deferring a
solution of the Taiwan issue into the future.
U.S. policymakers also are called on to respond to recent prominent calls from both
sides of the Strait for the United States to “facilitate” or “mediate” a reduction in tensions.
The governments in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington maintain that the issue of Taiwan’s
reunification is to be handled by people on both sides of the Strait.  The United States is not
to mediate cross-Strait differences.  Nevertheless, officials and nongovernment opinion
leaders in both Beijing and Taipei are now forthright in urging the United States to take
actions to ease cross-Strait tensions.
PRC officials want the United States to press Taiwan to avoid egregious efforts to
achieve greater international recognition, and to limit arms sales to Taiwan so that Taiwanese
leaders will not be able to use such U.S. support to resist PRC efforts to achieve reunification.
Officials and observers in Taipei ask the United States to press Beijing to avoid intimidation,
and to solidify U.S. ties with Taiwan so that Taipei can deal with the PRC on a more
equitable basis.  
Predictably, officials in Beijing and Taipei favor U.S. intervention that benefits their
respective sides.  There is little support for true mediation — that is, efforts by a neutral party
to get both sides to give up some significant parts of their respective negotiating positions in
order to reach a compromise solution.  Any U.S. efforts to press for such a compromise could
be portrayed as outside interference and redound negatively for U.S. relations with both
capitals.
Economic and Political Issues
Economic Prospects and Concerns
Prospects for continued economic growth in Taiwan are reasonably good.  The economy
grew rapidly (around 10% a year) in the 1970s and 1980s.  Growth declined to around 5-6%
a year in the 1990s as the economy matured. 
Taiwan’s economy remains vulnerable to rises in oil prices, decline in the U.S. economy,
and international  protectionism, especially in the United States.  The 1997-1998 Asian
financial crisis prompted a 20% decline in the value of Taiwan’s currency relative to the U.S.
dollar and an increase in inflationary pressures, but on balance Taiwan’s large foreign
exchange reserves, little foreign debt, and continued vigorous (5-6%) growth made it
attractive to investors and trading partners.  Taiwan’s GNP growth depends heavily on
exports, and about 25% of these exports go to the United States.  (Leading exports to the
United States include clothing and footwear, toys, and various electronic products.) 
In recent years, Taiwanese government officials have attempted to accommodate
increased U.S. pressure on trade issues.  They met many U.S. demands for greater market
access for U.S. goods and services and responded to U.S. complaints by taking stronger
measures to protect U.S. copyrights and other intellectual property rights. Taiwan in recent
years has worked hard to meet U.S. and other nations’ requirements for entry into the World
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Trade Organization (WTO); it negotiated a market access agreement with the United States
in February 1998 as a prelude to WTO entry.  
A different set of economic issues flows from Taiwan’s large foreign exchange reserves
and growing international economic power.  On the one hand, this trend prompts United
States and other foreign officials and business representatives to seek investment or financial
support from Taiwan.  On the other hand, it prompts some Americans to worry that Taipei
enterprises may use acquisitions of distressed U.S. companies to gain quick entry into
important markets heretofore dominated by the United States.
U.S. Policy Choices.  Many Americans concerned with the large U.S. trade deficit
call for strong action (possibly including limitations on foreign access to U.S. markets) to
improve the U.S. trade balance.  Others call for strict protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Rights against infringement from Taiwan and elsewhere.  They recognize that such action
could negatively affect the economic prosperity and related political stability of a number of
important U.S. trading partners, including Taiwan.  But they judge that the United States has
little choice but to take firm measures to protect its own markets and economic advancement.
Concern with American industrial competitiveness also motivates Americans who
question the sale of sophisticated U.S. industries and equipment to wealthy Taiwan
enterprises.  They favor strict review of such sales to insure that Taiwanese investors do not
reap a large competitive advantage through investment in technologically advanced U.S.
companies.
An opposing view comes from U.S. supporters of the Nationalist government, U.S.
supporters of the political opposition, Americans concerned with promoting greater political
democracy and continued economic prosperity in Taiwan, and free trade advocates who tend
to oppose measures designed to restrict foreign exporters’ access to U.S. markets.  They
emphasize the potentially negative results in terms of hampering U.S. investment in Taiwan,
Taiwanese investment in the United States, and U.S. interest in the political and social
stability long associated with economic prosperity in Taiwan.  They also emphasize the
negative results for U.S. interests in a free international trading system that they believe would
come from restrictive trade legislation or administrative actions aimed at Taiwan or others.
U.S. opinion also divides on Taiwan’s entry into the WTO.  Advocates in Congress and
elsewhere emphasize that Taiwan has satisfied almost all economic requirements for entry,
and charge that its entry is actually being held hostage to that of Beijing, which is not as far
along.  (Beijing insists that Taiwan cannot enter the WTO until after China has gained entry.)
The contrary U.S. view holds that to push for Taiwan’s entry before China’s would surely
anger the mainland leadership and perhaps jeopardize the current U.S. policy of engagement
with China; and it would have little chance of success as other WTO members would likely
bow to PRC pressure if the United States did not. 
Political Liberalization
Under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek (who ruled the Republic of China from 1945-
1975), the Nationalist Party-dominated government ruled in a sometimes harsh authoritarian
fashion.  It pursued policies of a strong national defense against the Communist mainland and
export-oriented economic growth.  It tolerated little open political dissent.
IB98034 08-01-01
CRS-10
In the 1970s, the United States and most developed countries recognized the PRC and
broke official ties with Taipei.  Under international pressure, Taiwan lost the China seat in the
U.N. and most official international bodies. These international setbacks challenged a major
source of the political legitimacy of the Nationalist regime.  It was harder to argue that people
on Taiwan should accept and pay for an elaborate central government administration that
included a majority of representatives who were elected on mainland China prior to the
Communist victory there in 1949 and the subsequent Nationalist retreat to Taiwan.
Nationalist leaders, especially Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, emphasized other
elements in support of the Nationalists’ rule, noting in particular the leadership’s successful
supervision of Taiwan’s dramatic economic progress.  Chiang and his associates also were
at pains to introduce to power more “Taiwanese” — 85% of the island’s population whose
roots go back to Taiwan prior to the influx of two million “mainlanders” associated with the
Nationalist regime at the time of the Communist victory on the mainland.  The vast majority
of the Nationalist Party’s rank and file were Taiwanese, and important Taiwanese dignitaries,
including the current President, Lee Teng-hui, were raised to high positions.
A combination of international and domestic pressures accelerated the pace of political
reform in the middle and late 1980s.  In September 1986, a formal opposition party, the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was formed.  President Chiang Ching-kuo ended
martial law in July 1987.  Following Chiang Ching- kuo’s death in January 1988, the new
President, Lee Teng-hui, reaffirmed a commitment to reform that would legalize opposition
parties and restructure parliamentary bodies.  In 1991,  President Lee ended the state of civil
war with the PRC and the associated “temporary provisions” that had given Nationalist
leaders “emergency” powers to deal with dissent.  Members of legislative bodies elected in
the mainland over 40 years earlier  retired.  An election was held  to fill all seats in a new
National Assembly, and in 1992 a new legislature was elected.
In annual island-wide elections since then, the Nationalist Party incrementally lost ground
to the DPP and the New China Party, founded in 1993.   In the March 23, 1996  presidential
elections, Lee Teng-hui won 53.9% of the vote, the DPP candidate, 21.1%, and two
conservative independents, 14.9%, and 9.9%, respectively.  In concurrent elections for the
National Assembly’s 334 seats, the Nationalists got 183 seats with 49.7% of the vote; the
DPP got 99 seats with 29.9%; and the New China Party got 46 seats with 13.7%. A
December 23-28, 1996, multiparty National Development Conference in Taiwan saw
continued strong Taiwanese opposition to Beijing’s “one country-two systems” reunification
formula and agreement on government reforms, notably the downgrading of Taiwan
provincial government functions.  The reforms were legally passed on July 18, 1997.  In
Beijing, officials voiced concern that the decision to diminish the Taiwanese provincial
government suggested that Taiwan was determined to highlight its status as an international
actor separate from China.
Island-wide elections for 23 mayors and magistrates on November 29, 1997,  registered
a big defeat for the Nationalist Party and big gains for the opposition Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP).  The DPP won 12 positions, up from 6 in the last election in 1993. The
Nationalists won 8, down from 16 four years earlier. The rest went to independents. The DPP
for the first time ever out-polled the Nationalists in the popular vote, 43.4% to 42%.  The
results left  DPP leaders in charge of local government for 72% of Taiwan’s people, while the
Nationalist leaders were in charge of only 22%.
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Taiwan’s legislative and municipal elections of December 5, 1998 were an important
victory for the ruling Nationalist Party and calmed for a time concerns in the United States,
mainland China, and Taiwan that voters might favor the opposition DPP, which in the past
has fielded a party platform favoring Taiwan self-determination — anathema for Beijing. The
Nationalists won a comfortable majority in the legislature, 123 out of 225 seats, with 46.4%
of the vote.  The DPP won 70 seats with 29.5% of the vote. In the closely watched race for
mayor of Taipei municipality, the Nationalist candidate defeated the DPP incumbent, Chen
Shui-bian, and slowed Chen’s perceived drive to run as the party’s standard bearer in the
March 2000 presidential election.
Taiwan’s Presidential Elections, March 18, 2000.  On March 18, 2000, Taiwan
voters went to the polls for only the second time to elect a new president in a hotly contested
election that was judged too close to call in the final days.  (The first direct election for
president was held in March 1996 when President Lee Teng-hui was elected over the strong
objections of Beijing.)  The winning candidate in the election of 2000, Chen Shui-bian, is a
member of the opposition DPP, the party that had been illegal until 1986.  The vote handed
a stunning defeat to Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), which had
had an unbroken tenure in power for 50 years.  With three leading presidential candidates,
Chen won with 39% of the popular vote, while an independent challenger, James Soong, ran
a close second with 36.5% of the vote.  The KMT candidate, sitting vice-president Lien Chan,
ran a distant third with only 23% of the vote.  President Chen took office on May 20, 2000.
U.S. officials have generally praised Chen for his careful political maneuvering in the first
year of his administration.  His political appointments of KMT members to high office suggest
that he wants to emphasize continuity as much as possible during the difficult transition in the
political landscape.  He has tried to maintain a balance between the more radical, pro-
independence advocates in his party while trying to avoid antagonizing Beijing on the cross-
strait issue.  On the latter point, he has made a pledge (conditioned upon Beijing’s not using
force against Taiwan) to 5 principles designed to appeal to Beijing: no declaration of
independence; no change in Taiwan’s formal name (Republic of China); no amendment of
Taiwan’s constitution with the “state-to-state” formula; no public referendum on
independence; and no repeal of Taiwan’s Guidelines on National Unification (with China).
The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) Party.  Dramatic political developments
occurred in June and July 2001 in Taiwan’s political landscape.  On June 16, 2001, former
President Lee Teng-hui, the standard-bearer of the KMT party for over 10 years, made a joint
appearance with President Chen Shui-bian and appeared to urge his own followers to support
Chen.  Observers speculated that the joint appearance meant that Lee was forming a political
alliance with Chen and the DPP.  More recently, on July 24, 2001, former KMT members
closely associated with former President Lee announced the formation of a new political
party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), sparking heated debate in Taiwan over the
implications of the new party for Taiwan’s political scene.  According to initial report, the
TSU ostensibly will follow policies favored and even crafted by former President Lee – such
as supporting the “state-to-state” approach in cross-strait talks with the PRC, and favoring
a “go slow” policy on Taiwan’s evolving economic and investment ties in the PRC.  
Given Taiwan’s current legislative-executive dynamic, the new party has potentially far-
reaching implications for the next legislative elections in December 2001.  Some have
predicted that the new TSU will split the DPP’s votes and effectively weaken its position in
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the legislature, making it even harder for President Chen to govern.  But others have pointed
out that former President Lee is a supporter of Chen and the DPP’s positions, and that the
new TSU party will be able to form a coalition with the DPP that will ensure it a governing
majority.  Some predict that in such a case, which would significantly boost those supporting
some type of an independent political identity for Taiwan, the implications for PRC-Taiwan-
U.S. political relations could be profound.  The new TSU party is scheduled to be formally
inaugurated at a party conference on August 12, 2001.  The party’s organizers say they plan
to field 40 candidates in the December 2001 legislative elections. 
106th Congress Legislation
S. 693 (Helms)/H.R. 1838 (DeLay)
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.  Both Senate and House measures authorize the
President to sell certain and specified weapons systems, such as diesel submarines and theater
missile defense equipment, to Taiwan. S. 693 introduced March 24, 1999; referred to
Committee on Foreign Relations.  Senate held hearings August 4, 1999.  H.R. 1838
introduced May 18, 1999, and referred to Committee on International Relations.  Committee
held markup October 26, 1999, and by a vote of 32-6, ordered bill to be reported, amended.
Reported October 28, 1999 (H.Rept. 106-423).  House passed H.R. 1838 February 2, 2000,
by a vote of 341-70.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 107-10 (H.R. 428)
Taiwan Participation in the World Health Organization (WHO).  Requires the Secretary
of State to initiate a U.S. plan to endorse and obtain observer status for Taiwan at the annual
week-long summit of the World Health Assembly in May 2001 in Geneva, Switzerland; and
requires the Secretary of State to submit the plan to Congress in a written, unclassified report.
Introduced on February 6, 2001, and referred to the House International Relations
Committee, which marked the bill up on March 28, 2001.  The House passed the bill on April
24, 2001, by a vote of 407-0.  The Senate passed the bill, amended, on May 9, 2001, by
unanimous consent.  On May 15, 2001, the House agreed to the Senate amendment by a vote
of 415-0.  The President signed the bill into law on May 29, 2001.  
H.R. 1646 (Hyde) 
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, introduced on April 27, 2001.  Section 813
declares that notwithstanding any other provision of law, Taiwan shall be treated as the
equivalent of a major non-NATO ally for purposes of the transfer or potential transfer of
defense articles or  services.  Section 814 requires the President to consult with both
Congress and with Taiwan armed forces, at the level of Vice-Chairman of the General Staff
or higher, on Taiwan’s defense needs. The House International Relations Committee marked
up the bill on May 2, 2001, and reported it (amended) on May 4, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-57).
The House passed the bill on May 16, 2001, by a vote of 352-73, and the bill was sent to the




07/24/01 — Supporters of Taiwan’s former President, KMT member Lee Teng-hui,
announced the formation of a new political party in Taiwan, the Taiwan
Solidarity Union (TSU).  The organizing meeting of the new party is
scheduled for August 12, 2001.
04/25/01 — In an ABC television interview, Charles Gibson asked President Bush if he
would use American military forces to defend Taiwan if China attacked the
island.  The President responded, “Whatever it took to help Taiwan defend
herself.”
04/24/01 — The Bush Administration announced its willingness to sell Taiwan a new
assortment of defense articles, to include diesel submarines, P-3C anti-
submarine aircraft, and Kidd-class destroyers. 
02/14/01 — Premier Chang Chun-hsiung announced that Taiwan would immediately
resume construction of its 4th nuclear power plant.  Construction had been
halted on October 27, 2000, by Taiwan’s new President, Chen Shui-bian. 
02/08/01 — Two Xinhua News Agency correspondents from the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) became the first PRC reporters ever to be posted in Taiwan.
01/22/01 — Vincent Siew, Vice-Chairman of Taiwan’s former ruling party, the
Kuomintang (KMT), proposed establishing a “cross-strait common market”
between Taiwan and China.  
01/02/01 — Taiwan established the first direct shipping link with China in more than 5
decades when 3 Taiwan ships embarked from Quemoy and Matsu and later
docked in the Chinese ports of Xiamen and Fuzhou.  China’s reaction to the
direct visit was cautious.
10/16/00 — China issued a white paper, “China’s National Defense 2000,” reinforcing its
claim that it would use force against Taiwan if Taiwan continued to refuse to
negotiate for reunification with China.  
08/17/00 — Taiwan’s President, Chen Shui-bian, made a brief transit stop in Los Angeles.
Originally invited to attend a private dinner with several U.S. Members of
Congress, President Chen declined to attend, reportedly under pressure from
U.S. government officials to avoid inflaming China.
05/20/00 — Chen Shui-bian was inaugurated as Taiwan’s newly elected president.  His
inauguration speech was viewed generally as a moderate attempt to lower
tensions with Beijing.
04/14/00 — According to the Washington Post, Taiwan is seeking to buy from the United




03/24/00 — President Lee Teng-hui resigned as head of the ruling Nationalist Party
because of his party’s unprecedented defeat in the presidential election. 
03/18/00 — In presidential elections in Taipei, DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian won with
approximately 39% of the vote.  
02/21/00 — The PRC issued a White Paper, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan
Issue,” with a mix of conciliatory gestures and a new threat that Taiwan’s
indefinite delay in cross-Strait talks may prompt use of force by the PRC.  
02/01/00 — The House passed H.R. 1838, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, by a
vote of 341-70.
11/17/99 — The ruling Kuomintang (KMT) Party expelled presidential candidate James
Soong and six of his key staff.  
09/21/99 — An earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale hit central Taiwan, killing
more than 2,000 people and leaving 100,000 homeless.
07/09/99 — Taiwan’s President, Lee Teng-hui, said that ties between Taiwan and the PRC
should be conducted on a “state-to-state” basis.  
04/19/99 — Taiwan DPP leader Chen Shui-bian began several days of seminars and
meetings in Washington, DC.
02/17/99 — The U.S. Defense Department issued a congressionally mandated report on
rising military strengths on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.  The report
intensified arguments on whether the United States should provide ballistic
missile defense systems to Taiwan despite strenuous objections from Beijing.
01/12/99 — A PRC foreign ministry spokesman warned the United States not to transfer
Theater Missile Defense and relevant technology to Taiwan.
11/10/98 — Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson met Lee Teng-hui and other leaders
during a trip to Taiwan.
10/23/98 — Secretary of Defense William Cohen had an unofficial meeting with Taiwan’s
armed forces chief of staff then visiting Washington.
10/19/98 — Taiwan negotiator Koo Chen-fu left Beijing after talks with Chinese party
leader Jiang Zemin and other senior officials.
01/24/98 — Elections for mayors of smaller cities, county assemblies, and city councils
showed the KMT’s continued dominance at the grass-roots level of
Taiwanese politics.  The Kuomintang won over 60% of the contested seats;
the DPP about 20%.
01/01/98 — South Africa, the most important country to maintain official ties with
Taiwan, broke official relations and established formal ties with China.
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03/30/97 — According to the New York Times, Speaker Gingrich disclosed in Shanghai
that he had told Chinese leaders that if the PRC attacked Taiwan, “We will
defend Taiwan. Period.”
03/10/96 — The Pentagon disclosed that two U.S. carrier battle groups had been ordered
to the Taiwan area.
03/08/96 — PRC forces began holding ballistic missile exercises in two impact areas near
Taiwan.  The actions were condemned by Congress and the administration.
01/24/96 — The New York Times reported on a series of explicit warnings from Chinese
leaders to the United States over the likelihood of military action in the
Taiwan Strait.
12/02/95 — In elections for the 164-seat Legislative Yuan, the KMT received 85 seats
with 45% of the vote; the DPP, 54 seats; and the New China Party, 21 seats.
05/22/95 — Yielding to congressional pressure, President Clinton decided to allow
Taiwan’s president to visit the United States the following month.
04/08/95 — President Lee Teng-hui responded to President Jiang Zemin’s eight-point
proposal on cross-Strait relations with his own proposal.
01/30/95 — China’s leader Jiang Zemin issued a positive sounding eight-point proposal on
Taiwanese-mainland relations.
09/07/94 — The Clinton Administration’s Taiwan policy review called for modestly
increased contacts with Taiwan. 
01/29/94 — In elections for numerous local councils and other posts, the Kuomintang
dominated, winning over 60% of the vote, while the DPP won about 15%.
09/02/92 — President Bush agreed to sell 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan.
07/15/87 — Martial law ended in Taiwan.
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